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Introduction 
 
Arguably, the current interest in the complexity sciences has its roots in the natural 
sciences, often in interplay with, and enhanced by, developments in mathematics and 
informatics (see e.g., Mitchell, 2009). An oft-cited reason for this interest has been 
the increased ability of current computing systems to deal with complex mathematics 
and algorithms (e.g., Colander and Kupers, 2014; Waldrop, 1992). As complexity is 
gaining more traction in the natural sciences, so does it in the social sciences (see e.g., 
Castellani, 2009). It should be noted here that the complexity sciences, or ‘complexity 
theory’ as it is more often called, encompass a rather loosely coupled group of 
theories, mechanisms, and metaphors, some of which are proven and others not, and 
that is not always internally consistent. The language of complexity has a clear 
transdisciplinary appeal (cf. Simon, 1962), so its popularity across the board is not 
surprising.1 For the sake of readability of the current text, we will simply refer to this 
group of theories as ‘complexity’.2 
 Naturally, complexity has also invaded the evaluation literature since the 1990s 
(e.g. through the work of Brenda Zimmerman), where it is increasingly discussed and 
applied (cf. Walton, 2014). For instance, this journal has recently published a steady 
number of complexity-related pieces (e.g., Barnes et al., 2003; Byrne, 2013; 
Callaghan, 2008; Davies, 2004; Mowles, 2014; Rogers, 2008; Sanderson, 2000; 
Verweij and Gerrits, 2013; Westhorp, 2012). A search within the journal on the terms 
“complexity theory”, “complex system” or “complexity science” yielded forty-nine 
articles in a growing trend (see Figure 1).3 Inquiries with Scopus into complexity and 
evaluation yielded similar results, as shown in Figure 2.4 In this article, we take stock 
of recent progress and discuss what complexity holds for evaluation by discussing 
three recent books. Before doing so, it is necessary to discuss the issue of theory 
transfer. 
 
                                                            
1 Interested readers are referred to e.g., the work of David Byrne (i.a., 1998; Byrne and Callaghan, 
2014) for an extended discussion about how complexity matters to the social sciences.  
2 It is acknowledged that this can be considered imprecise given the many ways in which ‘complexity’ is 
understood and discussed. However, an extensive discussion of what complexity exactly is lies beyond 
the purpose of this contribution. We would like to point readers to e.g., Rescher (1998) for an excellent 
in-depth overview.  
3 The same search for the American Journal of Evaluation yielded twenty-three articles. 
4 The syntax used for the results shown in Figure 2 is: TITLE-ABS-KEY ("complexity theory" OR 
"complex adaptive systems" OR "CAS" OR "soft system" OR "eco* system" OR "complexity science*" 
OR "complexity thinking" OR "complex system*") AND TITLE-ABS-KEY ("policy eval*" OR "prog* 
eval*" OR "policy analysis" OR "formative eval*" OR "process eval*" OR "outcome eval*" OR "impact 
eval*" OR "context eval*" OR "project eval*") AND (LIMIT-TO (DOCTYPE, "ar")). 
 
Figure 1: complexity-related articles in the journal Evaluation (search performed on 
23-04-2015) 
 
 
Figure 2: complexity-related publications about evaluation by year, non-cumulative 
(search performed on 29-06-2015) 
 
Theory transfer 
 
If anything, concepts from complexity enable versatile, open-ended heuristics that 
invite a wide range of applications and domains. The diversity of complexity’s roots 
and domains of application brings into view the issue of theory transfer. Theory 
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transfer is reinforced by popular accounts that talk about complexity in generic terms 
and that assert that its concepts transcend disciplinary boundaries. However, it 
requires a leap of faith to use a concept such as Bénard instability from fluid 
dynamics,5 to name just one, to explain societal change.  
 The question then is whether a concept from one domain accurately describes 
the object of research in another domain (Knuuttila, 2011). Crucial in theory transfer 
is the difference between structural representation and surrogative reasoning. The 
first allows using a concept for drawing conclusions about the thing it represents, 
whilst the second allows using a concept from a domain as a surrogate in our 
reasoning about another domain (Swoyer, 1991). For example, the application of a 
certain model from the source domain to the target domain can be considered 
structural representation when it manages to address similar mechanisms and to 
generate similar types of statements. If a concept from the source domain is used as a 
metaphor in the target domain, it can be considered surrogative reasoning. The 
boundary between the two usages is not always clear; a strict application of a model 
cannot accommodate certain features in the target domain, rendering model 
modification inevitable (Bolinska, 2013). Conversely, a metaphor may in fact point to 
actual causal relationships that need to be fleshed out more thoroughly 
(Chettiparamb, 2006). 
 The issue is compounded by the fact that complexity seems to repeat many 
notions from systems theories, something already pointed out by Steven Phelan in 
1999. Indeed, systems theories and associated holistic or ‘whole system’ approaches 
date further much further back than many of the concepts featured in complexity. 
François (1999) explored the emergence of systems thinking in the fields of 
philosophy and science and found the earliest mentions to be in the 17th century 
works of Descartes and Leibnitz. A more contemporary approach, i.e. one using 
terminology that most current scientists would feel comfortable with, can be credited 
to Von Bertalanffy whose General Systems Theory contained many features now 
rediscovered in complexity (Gerrits, 2012). And while General Systems Theory was 
introduced in 1968, its intellectual foundations were developed in the 1930s. Von 
Bertalanffy’s heritage would be further developed in the social sciences, for example 
by Forrester (e.g., 1971), Checkland (e.g., 1981), Senge (1990), and Flood (e.g., 1999). 
Although there is much utility in this fusion, it puts claims of complexity being ‘the 
new paradigm’ in a different light. Complexity’s transfer and application are 
notoriously hard and sometimes at odds with more accepted evaluation methods; 
however, this does not make complexity new (cf. Mowles, 2014). In fact, one could 
argue that evaluations were always complex. As such, we may well consider it a 
rediscovery.  
 The reason for discussing theory transfer before discussing the books is that it 
will help clarifying the wide diversity of approaches and applications encountered in 
the books. Some authors approach complexity from the daily experience that ‘things 
are complex’ and that, therefore, evaluations need to reflect that experience of 
                                                            
5 Prigogine and Stengers (1984) give a clear explanation of Bénard instability in Chapter 5 of their 
book. 
complexity. Others may take the conceptual route and start from the existing corpus 
of complexity literature to define a revised framework for evaluation methods. 
Naturally, each point of entry generates entirely different types of accounts.  
 Of course, there are recurring themes, such as non-linearity, emergence, and 
far-from-equilibrium (Byrne and Callaghan, 2014). These themes stress the 
importance context, time, and human agency in evaluation (Verweij, 2015; Verweij 
and Gerrits, 2013). However, a group of related and oft-cited concepts, theorems, and 
ideas does not make a consistent and proven theory. This absence of a clear, 
universally agreed-upon causal theory of complexity for the social sciences is not 
necessarily problematic for complexity scientists because it can serve as template to 
start from in order to generate answers (cf. Byrne and Callaghan, 2014). As discussed 
elsewhere (Gerrits and Marks, 2014), it is inherent to maturing theories that gaps 
appear. The question is not whether these will appear – they will – but whether they 
are solved in the long run, i.e., whether signs of scientific progress are visible. What 
thus matters is how complexity’s notions influence evaluative thinking and research, 
in terms of the methods used and the kind of conclusions generated. 
 
Three books 
 
The books discussed in this essay are Forss et al.’s (2011) edited volume Evaluating 
the Complex: Attribution, Contribution, and Beyond, Patton’s (2011) Developmental 
Evaluation: Applying Complexity Concepts to Enhance Innovation and Use, and 
Wolf-Branigin’s (2013) Using Complexity Theory for Research and Program 
Evaluation. Each of these books is explicitly positioned in the field of complexity and 
evaluation.6 Our discussion focusses on a number of questions. First, we will consider 
why complexity matters to the authors. Second, we will look at how complexity is 
defined in the books. Third, we review how the authors have transferred complexity 
to evaluation. Finally, we evaluate whether the authors have been able to achieve 
their books’ aims. We conclude with a critical reflection on the future of complexity in 
evaluation. 
 
Why complexity? 
 
Wolf-Branigin addresses complexity-informed evaluation for social work researchers 
and evaluators. His point of entry is the experience of complexity in social work 
regarding social workers as “followers of complexity” (2013: 5) because social 
workers, by definition, need to understand the complex networks in which needing 
people are entangled. As such, social workers are said to be intuitively familiar with 
how complexity operates, yet lack the vocabulary and methodological toolkit to deal 
with it effectively. The purpose of his book, then, is to provide an introduction to 
                                                            
6 Related books have appeared during the same period (Funnell and Rogers, 2011; Morell, 2010; 
Williams and Hummelbrunner, 2010), but are less explicitly positioned in the complexity sciences; 
they are not part of our discussion but have been reviewed elsewhere (Hargreaves and Podems, 2012). 
complexity, including a series of complexity-friendly methods for social workers, and 
social work researchers and evaluators. 
 The volume edited by Forss et al. emerged out of a similar need, namely: the 
quest for theories and methods that could reflect the social complexity as 
encountered by evaluators. If the world is complex, they reason, the theories and 
methods of evaluation should mirror that complexity. For example, they highlight 
how similar interventions can lead to different outcomes in different instances, which 
calls for “complex strategies” (2011: 1). Their concerns are more than methodological, 
as they argue that public policies and accountability fail to recognize this complexity 
of the public sector. This lack of understanding is fueled by, and motivates, evaluation 
methods that do not take the complexity into account. 
 Of the three books discussed here, Patton’s (2011) is the most-cited one. Heavily 
influenced by Brenda Zimmerman (e.g. Zimmerman, Lindberg & Plsek 1998; 
Westley, Zimmerman & Patton, 2007), he is very explicit about his reason for using 
complexity. In the introductory chapters he writes: “[…] what brings me to 
complexity is its utility for understanding certain evaluation challenges. Complexity 
concepts can be used to identify and frame a set of intervention circumstances that 
are amenable to a particular situationally appropriate evaluation response, what I am 
calling here developmental evaluation. This makes dealing with complexity a defining 
characteristic of developmental evaluation’s niche. Principles for operating in 
complex adaptive systems inform the practice of developmental evaluation” (2011: 9 
original italics). 
 All three books appear to be rooted in a dual concern: that the complexity of 
social reality is often ignored, leading to misguided evaluations and policy 
recommendations, and that the current methodological toolbox is not particularly 
well-suited to deal with that complexity. The ways in which the authors deal with this 
dual concern, though, are considerably different, as we will discuss below. 
 
What complexity? 
 
As said, there are multiple points of entry in complexity. Inevitably, any chosen point 
also discards other options. To Wolf-Branigin, complexity or complexity theory is a 
new science or paradigm for the social sciences. He follows Page (2011) in discussing 
various definitions of complexity, ultimately settling on Mitchell’s (2009) definition 
which focuses on the self-organizing aspects of complex systems, out of which 
collective behavior emerges. This ties in with the school of thought around 
emergence, not necessarily a new theme (cf. Juarrero and Rubino, 2010; Vesterby, 
2008), but a very relevant and persuasive one still. Emergent behavior, in Wolf-
Branigin’s view, is a process that is embedded in complex systems. Complex systems 
become complex adaptive systems when the constituent elements show mutual 
adaptation. 
 While they start from the experience of complexity, Forss et al. assert that there 
is a difference between complexity as an experience and complexity as precise quality 
of social processes and structures. Still, they somewhat circumvent the issue by giving 
multiple definitions of what they would like to focus on. On the one page it concerns a 
system state somewhere between order and chaos, which resonates with statements 
from physicists such as Prigogine and Stengers (1984) and management scholars 
such as Stacey (e.g., 1992). Yet, elsewhere they claim to focus on the non-linear and 
situated nature of complex systems. These are not mutually exclusive things, but the 
conceptual back-and-forth makes it a bit harder to grasp where the point of entry lies, 
even though we fully accept the possibility of multiple starting points. 
 Patton, then, does something similar and offers a number of core properties 
upon which his narrative is built, namely: non-linearity, emergence, adaptive 
behavior, uncertainty, dynamics, and coevolution. As he does not need to 
accommodate a wide range of authors in his monography, it is easier for him to 
maintain a consistent narrative, something which sometimes lacks in the edited 
volume by Forss et al.7 Thus, Patton describes rather than defines complexity but it 
works because the argument is closely tied to the complexity core properties he 
describes. Later on in the book, he also bolts Holling’s adaptive cycle and panarchy 
(e.g., Gunderson and Holling, 2002) on top of the already rich conceptual library. 
Although the adaptive cycle helps tying the concepts together, it also increases the 
conceptual density. 
 In some ways, there appears little conceptual and theoretical progress since the 
early iterations of complexity for the social sciences. All authors felt obliged to go 
through the canon of complexity at some point in their books. While this can be 
useful to novices, it is also telling that, on the whole, these overviews are nearly 
identical to books published a while ago. A reference to, e.g., Marion’s The Edge of 
Organization (1999) would have been a more efficient way of dealing with this.8 
Either way, this observation leads us to the question what the progress has been in 
the two decades since the first books on social complexity where published. The fact 
that the current books repeat the same canon, without explicitly discussing whether 
certain concepts and mechanisms have been proven in the social realm (which, 
incidentally, is not the case), leads one to think that complexity has come to a 
standstill.  
 Yet, when it comes to defining complexity, there are subtle differences between 
these books and the crop of publications from the mid-1990s. One favorable change, 
in our view, is that the uncritical claims of ‘new science’ and ‘break-through paradigm 
shifts’, so universally presented in those early works, are now much more toned-
down.9 Wolf-Branigin still does it, but given his well-informed overview of complexity 
and understanding of existing literature, one suspects that these statements serve, 
first and foremost, to grab readers’ attention and not because he genuinely believes 
that this is new science. Second, all authors warn against a too generous use of the 
                                                            
7 Cf. Patton (2015). 
8 In fact, there are many possible references here. Marion’s is an interesting one because it gives a 
useful overview of all available mechanisms from the complexity sciences to be used in social scientific 
research.  
9 See for example the books by Ralph Stacey. Stacey, in the appendix of his 2012 book, wrote an 
admiringly critical self-reflection, in which he says: “[…] the incorporation of notions from the 
complexity sciences led to some additional points but did not represent any significant shift in how I 
was thinking about organizations” (2012: 150). 
term ‘complexity’. Yes, some situations are complex but others are not, and what 
works in one context may not work in another context (which, in itself, is a trace of 
complexity). For example, the second chapter in Forss et al., authored by Rogers, 
deals with the differences between simple, complicated, and complex. Whereas 
complicated interventions are said to “[…] have multiple components, which need to 
be brought together to achieve clearly specified outcomes”, complex interventions 
“[…] are more usefully conceptualized as having complex aspects where they are 
inherently dynamic and emergent” (2011: 35). As such, whereas complicated 
interventions can be evaluated by asking “what works for whom in what contexts” 
(2011: 35), in complex programs “it is not possible to report on these in terms of 
‘what works’ […] “because what ‘it’ is constantly changes” (2011: 36).  
 Such a distinction is less apparent in Wolf-Branigin’s book but it definitely 
underlies his argument. Patton, then, also discusses the distinction between simple, 
complicated, and complex, but differently so from Rogers’ account. He understands 
this tripartite as a relative scale (2011: 86–90). Complicated situations are 
characterized by either a high degree of conflict between stakeholders or a high 
degree of uncertainty and unpredictability about how to solve problems. Complex 
situations feature both high degrees of social conflict and unpredictability. It is not 
surprising then that the authors disagree about the ways in which these distinctions 
are made; Patton, in his review of Forss et al., argues that their book concerns 
complicatedness instead of complexity (Patton, 2015). This indicates that the 
narratives are more nuanced than they were twenty years ago, but convergence 
towards one unambiguous framework is still far off.  
 
How are complexity and evaluation related? 
 
The next question then is: how do the authors relate complexity to evaluation? 
Unsurprisingly, given the focus of the book on social work and workers, complexity is 
applied by Wolf-Branigin to conceptualize social service interventions as complex 
systems (Chapter 2). This requires a complexity-friendly set of evaluation methods: 
qualitative and quantitative methods need to be blended. Evaluators are told to 
engage in both inductive and deductive reasoning. To these ends, he offers a suite of 
methods that could be used for evaluations: agent-based modelling, participatory 
action research, narrative research, developmental evaluation, social networks, 
cluster analysis, and spatial analysis. This suite serves to carefully highlight both the 
metaphorical as well as the mathematical aspects of complexity. We contend that, 
although some methods are well-suited for evaluation research, the utility of others, 
such as agent-based modeling, could be contested because there can (and will) be big 
gaps between the model’s outcome and reality. However, we agree with, e.g. Epstein 
(2008), that there are many reasons why the process of modeling, model outcomes 
aside, will be very informative for ex-ante evaluations. The inclusion of such methods 
is therefore entirely justifiable.  
 Less than an overview of what is available and more of a coherent, yet 
sprawling, offering is Patton’s proposal for developmental evaluation. Complexity’s 
role in evaluation, in his view, is first and foremost to serve as a heuristic and sense-
making device. From that understanding follows an evaluation approach that 
(apparently in contrast to more common approaches) favors dynamics over stability, 
uncertainty over certainty, equifinality and multi-finality over general laws, etcetera. 
At heart, developmental evaluation is a dynamic kind of evaluation that does not only 
seek to identify causal relationships and to serve accountability, but that also offers 
an approach that interacts with the programs it evaluates, preferably feeding results 
back into the program on the fly, so as to develop it (hence the name). Given these 
aims, Patton calls upon evaluators to have a complexity-friendly mindset. The aspects 
discussed in the book should help building that mindset. Questions, how-to’s, 
checklists, and examples are provided throughout the book, although it would be too 
far of a stretch to say that it offers a quick and easy guide on how to do developmental 
evaluation. 
 The volume by Forrs et al. is the most difficult to assess because, being an edited 
volume, there are several ways in which complexity and evaluation are understood 
and discussed. After the introduction, seven case studies are presented by different 
authors. The studies start from the experience of complexity, i.e. a certain policy or a 
program is deemed complex because of e.g. conflicting stakeholder interests, which 
then necessitates an alternative, more complexity-friendly evaluation method. 
Naturally, these methods differ. Some are built on realist evaluation, others rely on 
contribution analysis. In some cases, and the interesting case material 
notwithstanding, we felt that the complexity framework has been added in hindsight 
or has been developed during the evaluation process. Patton himself remarked that 
the contributions are not clear about whether the cases are complex or complicated, 
which is more than just a semantic difference. Marra, in the last chapter, draws 
attention to the complexity of the evaluation experience and process instead of the 
complexity of the case. This is a tell-tale sign of the ambiguity surrounding the 
authors’ understandings of complexity.  
 
Have the books delivered? 
 
Wolf-Branigin intended to provide an agenda-setting, introductory piece about 
complexity in the field of social work and evaluation research. By implication, it has 
resulted in a book that portrays what he believes ‘is out there’ in the complexity 
sciences – a pocket guide, if you will, for social work researchers and evaluators. For 
more in-depth readings about the subjects covered in the book, Wolf-Branigin refers 
to other works that we have also found very useful. To evaluators with prior 
knowledge of complexity, this book is less appealing as it favors breadth over depth. 
The trade-off of this overview is that the book does little to extend the existing 
complexity canon. But then again, that was never the purpose. Laudably, he stresses 
the importance of using both qualitative and quantitative methods for studying 
complexity, even though he veers towards computational approaches over qualitative 
ones. Naturally, actually combining qualitative and quantitative methods is 
notoriously hard, and we would have liked to see clear instructions about this for 
concrete research projects.  
 Judging by the discussions, online and in journal articles, Patton’s 
developmental evaluation has hit a nerve with parts of the evaluation community. We 
think that his book features useful reminders of the pitfalls of more common 
evaluation approaches, and offers avenues of thought for adaptive approaches that 
acknowledge social complexity. The book is somewhat more antagonistic than Wolf-
Branigin’s that just demonstrates how current methods can be deployed in 
complexity-friendly ways. Indeed, Patton offers an alternative approach, not just an 
overview of existing methods, and that necessitates him to contrast it to other 
approaches. Given the citations of the book, Patton seems to have addressed a 
pressing issue. A more in-depth look into these citations, however, reveals many 
citations that do little else than saying things such as ‘according to Patton, complexity 
matters in evaluation.’ This is undoubtedly true but it does not do justice to Patton’s 
argument. And that is exactly our critical note: while we agree with the call for a 
different mindset, we wonder whether Patton’s book will help the struggling 
evaluators to develop comprehensive, complexity-friendly evaluations.  
 Of the three books, Forss et al. seems to deviate most from its original 
definitions of complexity given in the introduction. This is inherent to edited volumes 
with a large number of authors but that is not really an argument for lowering 
expectations. However, we should also note that the book has multiple goals. The 
authors also wish to encourage debate and to point at interesting questions for the 
future of evaluations. This type of goal allows for more variety than a strictly research 
or theory-driven book. Perhaps the book is more about the match (or lack thereof) 
between evaluation methods and the object of evaluation. The reasoning is: because 
the object of evaluation is complex (i.e. changes over time etc.), it challenges 
evaluation methods that do not account for that complexity. In that sense, they are in 
the same room as Patton. Ultimately, the authors contend that they struggle with the 
complexity sciences, which, in their view, may be more a set of ideas than a 
theoretical framework. They also acknowledge that complexity features a language 
that is relatively foreign to evaluators and that is difficult to operationalize.  
 
Conclusions and reflections 
 
The books can be assessed by different measures. Do they serve as an introduction to 
complexity for evaluation purposes? Yes, all three of them give accounts of what 
complexity is and why it ought to matter to evaluation. The overviews seem to reflect 
the common canon of complexity. This brings us to the second measure: do the books 
add anything to the canon? No, while replicating faithfully, they do not add novelties 
beyond semantic suggestions. We are aware that we are walking a thin line here 
because one could argue that a ‘new’ way of understanding evaluation is a valuable 
addition itself. Our counter-argument is that, if anything, it is an extension of what 
has already been said in many niches within the social sciences. Do the books account 
for theory transfer? Yes, to a great extent and with much care. Most authors are quite 
aware of how they utilize the concepts. Nevertheless, one should be wary of claims 
such as, e.g., ‘complex systems all coevolve’, in referring to the mechanism of 
coevolution between species and their environment as analyzed by e.g. Ehrlich and 
Raven (1964). What systems are we exactly talking about? Does it concern social 
systems as well? Has that been proven? If so, what evidence of coevolution do we 
have? How does reciprocal selection work? Often, such questions are not addressed 
directly. If proof is offered, it is highly circumstantial. Alternatively, authors (in 
particular Patton) chicane around such issues by saying that complexity is a 
sensitizing concept.  
 We would like to return to the issue touched upon in the first part of this essay: 
why is it necessary to launch a new discrete branch of evaluation studies around 
complex systems? This question is particularly pressing given that there is already a 
long tradition of systems’ theories, and because the methods mentioned by the 
authors discussed here are not new (cf. Mowles’ 2014 similar argument). One could 
even argue that complexity does little more than gluing together some existing 
methods and combining it with ‘a different mindset’ in these books. So, why then risk 
“becoming a fad” (cf. McKelvey, 1999)? There are a number of possible explanations. 
It could be that these and other authors are genuinely convinced that there is 
something completely novel in complexity. If so, this calls for a more thorough 
comparison with existing approaches that lurk in the same corner of science and a 
more developed argumentation about the added value, beyond the many somewhat 
generic statements. One could also argue that scientists and practitioners alike have a 
stake in launching a new term and claiming it theirs. That can be considered a normal 
side-effect of competitive science. But if that is the case, it would still require authors 
to work vigorously on generating evidence for their claims. 
 Following Bartels (1987), we agree that there is an element of randomness or 
chance in the development of social sciences. Old theories can be rediscovered; 
disregarded theories can become valuable again. The selection of a particular theory 
is not necessarily a process that has scientific rigor. However, we feel that it is truly 
necessary to make the next step. If complexity is to be taken seriously, it will have to 
move on and start producing concrete results that are markedly better – and we use 
that term here on purpose, given the large claims – than results produced using 
‘standard’ methods. We would like to end, however, with a positive note. The fact that 
these and other books are being published and are getting attention means that they 
appeal to the evaluation domain. All three books offer a massive range of challenges. 
These are perfect starting points for complexity-informed evaluation research, or 
putting it more strongly: there are no longer reasons to post-pone empirical testing. 
Hopefully, we will have a whole range of new books with inspiring results to review in 
a few years from now.   
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